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Theory and Evidence from Rural China
In rural areas of developing countries, people tend to live in extended family
groups. These groups vary from society to society, but in general, the elderly tend
to live with their children. As economic development occurs, the population of
a country becomes urbanized, people tend to move to urban areas and have less
children, which leads to a demographic transition. Simultaneously, extended fam-
ily living arrangements begin to change. In the United States and other developed
countries, the breakdown of the extended family has been well documented (e.g.
Kotlikoff and Morris, 1990; Costa, 1998).
The process of changes in living arrangements has been more recently docu-
mented in the fast growing economies of Asia (e.g. Hermalin, 2002). The process
has also been documented in some of the rapidly developing economies of Asia
(Lee, Parish and Willis, 1994; Lillard and Willis, 1997). As these economies have
become wealthier, the elderly have begun to live on their own. Research on Tai-
wan (Martin, 1991; Knodel and Ofstedal, 2002), Thailand, and China (Benjamin,
Brandt, and Rozelle, 2000) has found that cohabitation by the elderly with chil-
dren has declined with rapid economic growth. It seems likely that as economic
growth continues and family sizes decline, as theories of the family predict that
this trend will continue (Becker, 1974).
In this paper, I will focus on exploring the effects of family size on cohab-
itation with and transfers to the elderly. Most theoretical models that explore
intergenerational links effectively focus on one parent and one child (Becker and
Tomes, 1979; BernheimandStark, 1988)orfocusontransfersfromparentstosev-
eral children (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1995).
However, if rapid economic growth leads to higher incomes among children than
the elderly, understanding the way that children decide to transfer some of their
wealth to parents is important. In this paper, I will model transfers in a static set-
ting from children to parents. The model generalizes to a situation in which older
parents have comparable incomes to their children, as in those cases children will
not give their parents money.
I will use the model to generate empirical hypotheses about transfer behavior
among children and cohabitation. I will then test these hypotheses using data col-
lected in rural China in late 2000. Rural China makes a good case in which to
test the theory, for several reasons. First, other authors have found that the elderly
are beginning to live on their own in rural China (Benjamin et al., 2000). Since
migration out of China’s villages accelerated throughout the 1990s (de Brauw etal., 2002), the elderly are likely to continue to live alone in rural China. Finally,
living standards in elderly households in the data set I will use are much lower
on average than those in other households in which the elderly live, whether mea-
sured by expenditures per capita, income per capita, or asset holdings (Table ??).
The model and the empirical work will shed some light on these differences.
Thispaperisorganizedasfollows. Theﬁrstsectionwillbrieﬂyreviewsomeof
the literature on elderly living arrangements both in the United States and among
Asian cultures. The next section will develop the theoretical model in the paper,
and I will discuss hypotheses that are suggested by the model. In the third section,
I will describe the data set, the variables I will use to test the model, and I will
present my results. The fourth section concludes.
1 Extended Family in the West and Asia
Prior to industrial development in the West, the elderly most often lived in ex-
tended family arrangements with one or more of their kids. Economists and other
social scientists have several theories regarding the reason that the elderly most
often live with some of their children. Perhaps the best known is the Caldwell
(1978) hypothesis. Caldwell believed that there are two types of societies. In pre-
transitional societies, birth rates are high and stable. Wealth in pre-transitional
societies in general ﬂows from younger to older generations, because children are
able to work in the ﬁelds at early ages to help produce crops. According to Cald-
well, an important transition occurs in which children become relatively costly.
As a result, parents have less children as they will be a net loss, and capital or
resources begin to ﬂow in net terms from parents to children.
There is no empirical evidence that the Caldwell hypothesis is true, as re-
searchers who have tried to estimate positive net ﬂows from children to parents in
less developed countries have not found them (Bergstrom, 1996). Another broad
set of theories that have been posed to explain parent-child interactions are what
Lee et al. (1994) call “mutual aid models.” Parents and children might decide
to cohabit because sharing certain consumer durable goods can create economies
of scale, and other in-kind exchanges might be preferred. Certainly, parents who
live with their children may work on the farm, cook meals, or provide child care
for their grandchildren. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Cox (1987) believe that
families may pool resources in order to provide implicit insurance for one another
by reducing the variance of total income. However, this concept does not apply
as well to rural economies in general, because households that either farm or runsmall businesses are likely to share the same income risks across members.
Thereisstrongevidencethatfamilyarrangementschangeinnatureassocieties
develop. Costa (1998) reports that in the late 19th century, over three quarters of
the elderly in the United States lived in extended family arrangements. A signiﬁ-
cant proportion of the elderly only began to live on their own in the United States
during the middle of the 20th century. Costa ﬁnds that part of this change can be
attributed to an income effect; as incomes among the elderly increased through
social security and pensions, they could choose to live on their own if they pre-
ferred. Since Costa ﬁnds the income effect to be somewhat important, as incomes
rise elsewhere one would expect to see living arrangements and transfers to the
elderly change as well.
In Asia, this transition is particularly acute, because children are much wealth-
ierthanparentsinseveralcountries. Becker(1993)theorizesthatinsuchsocieties,
parents might raise their children to feel guilt if they do not conform to altruistic
norms (Becker, 1993). Several authors have asserted this is the case in several dif-
ferent settings. Davis-Friedmann (1983) discusses Confucian orthodoxy, which
stresses ﬁlial piety and the “rights of the old” over the young, which permeates
culture in China. Taiwanese textbooks stress that abandoning one’s parents is the
most shameful thing one can do (Lee et al., 1994). In Malaysia, the government
has created incentives for conforming to Confucian ideals; it gives tax credits to
adult children who coreside with their parents (DaVanzo and Chan, 1994).
Although China shares cultural attributes with other Asian countries that have
begun to undergo this transition, China’s experience will be different for several
reasons. First, China is much more rural than other countries; as of 2001, China’s
National Bureau of Statistics still contends that more than half of China’s popu-
lation resides in rural areas. Moreover, China’s family planning policies which
began in the early 1970s will force a demographic transition which will primarily
occur at lower income levels than the transitions in the West and other East Asian
countries. The UN projects that 19% of China’s population will be aged over 60
by 2025, almost on par with the United States (23%) and Japan (24%), though the
latter two will still undoubtedly have much higher income levels.
Since Asian economies, including China, have both recently gone through
rapid economic growth and the beginnings of the demographic transition, one can
characterize these economies with the following attributes. First, adult children
often have much higher incomes than their parents, as their human capital has
been relatively richly rewarded in the new economy. Second, children feel either
altruismtowardstheirparentsorsomelevelofobligationtowardstheirwell-being.
In the next section, I further explore the interaction between these two observa-tions theoretically.
2 A Theory of Intergenerational Transfers
Several authors have focused on understanding the decision regarding whether
families live as extended units or in separate units. The decision is sometimes
modeled as being made jointly by children and parents, and is sometimes modeled
as purely the parents’ decision (e.g. ). Here, I build a static model of the inter-
action between children and parents, the important feature being that the children
are altruistic towards their parents. The model is similar to that of Laitner (1997),
but it abstracts from the dynamic setting in which many models of intrafamily
altruism are based. However, it also extends previous models to include multiple
children.
I justify the assumption that I can model altruism in this setting as follows. I
assume that a shock has occurred that affects incomes for the younger generation,
but has not affected incomes for the parents in the model. This assumption is
consistent with ﬁndings regarding household incomes and wages during China’s
economic transition, and is broadly consistent with earlier periods of rapid growth
in Asian countries such as Taiwan (e.g. Lee, Parish, and Willis, 1994). Authors
have both found that the returns to schooling to have increased dramatically over
the 1990s (e.g. Zhang and Zhao, 2002) and that they have increased even more
among younger people (e.g. de Brauw and Rozelle, 2004). Since the young are
well educated relative to older generations, their incomes will be higher than the
elderly in most cases, particularly in the absence of a pension program. As a
result, the model assumes that parents are no longer making monetary transfers
to children, either because they have either already occurred, or because parents
have signiﬁcantly lower incomes than children.
Consider an elderly parent with a utility function U(cp) = ln(cp)+γp1 ln(c1)+
... + γpn ln(cn), where cp represents the parent consumption, ci represents con-
sumption by person i, and γpi are a set of weights that deﬁne the level that the
parents care for each child. The index i represents each of the n children. Fi-
nally, the parents will consume all of their income, which consists of their income
wp plus any transfers Ti they receive from their children. I further assume that
the children all have higher incomes than the parents, so Ti ≥ 0. Therefore the
parental consumption is completely determined by the decisions of their children
regarding transfers, and so cp ≡ wp +
P
i Ti.
Each of the n children of the elderly have utility functions U(ci) = ln(ci) +γi ln(cp), for i = 1,...,n. Note that the children care about their own con-
sumption as well as the consumption of their parents. Each child also has an
income of wi, and they make a decision about a transfer to make to their par-
ents, Ti. So child i’s total income is wi − Ti, where Ti ≥ 0. Since the parents
consumption is completely determined by the sum of the transfers they receive
from the children plus their income, I can rewrite child i’s utility function as




T−i represents the transfers
from all of the other children.
2.1 A Benchmark Case: One Child
If the parents have only one child, then the child simply maximizes her utility








which is subject to the constraint that T1 ≥ 0; the child will not give the parent
a transfer if the marginal utility of that transfer is less than the marginal utility of
her own consumption. The parent’s consumption is then deterministic, and it is
easy to show that the parents consumption is c1
p =
γ1(w1+wp)
1+γ1 given that a transfer
occurs.
Note that from a social planner’s perspective, unless the parent and child are
perfectly altruistic, the transfer amount leads to inefﬁcient allocations between the
child and the parent. The social planner will seek to maximize the function:
(1 + γ1)cp + (1 + γp)c1 (2)
subject to the constraint that cp + c1 ≤ w1 + wp, which is essentially the intra-
household bargaining problem posed by Chiappori (1992). The optimal amount




(1 + γ1)(w1 + wp)
2 + γ1 + γp
(3)
The optimal amount of parental consumption c∗
p is larger than c1
p, because the child
does not take into account the parent’s marginal utility of consumption when de-
termining an amount to give. Rather, they only account for the utility gained by









(2 + γ1 + γp)(1 + γ1)
(4)
As both the child and the parent care more about each other’s consumption (as γ1
and γp approach 1), actual parental consumption approaches c∗
p.
2.2 Transfers with Two Children
When more than one child is potentially giving to their parents, each child makes
a strategic decision about how much to give to their parents, based on the parents’
wealth and the transfer made by the other child. Each child assumes that the other
gives an optimal response, so a Nash equilibrium results between the two children.
Writing the optimal transfer for child 1 as a function of child 2’s transfer gives:
T1 =




The optimal transfer for child 2 is the same, with the opposite subscripts. There is
only one difference between equation (5) and equation (1), which is that child 1’s
transfer will drop as soon as child 2 will give a transfer. Furthermore, if T ∗
2 = 0,
equation (5) is exactly the same as equation (1). Intuitively, if child 2 either does
not feel much altruism towards the parent, or has a relatively low income, then
child 1 gives a transfer as if there is no second child. This result is true no matter
how many children the parents have.
If both children give a positive transfer (e.g. T ∗
1 > 0, T ∗
2 > 0), then each child
takes the other’s best response into account when choosing an amount to give.







γ1(1 + γ2)w1 − γ2(w2 + wp)
γ1 + γ2 + γ1γ2
,
γ2(1 + γ1)w2 − γ1(w1 + wp)
γ1 + γ2 + γ1γ2
!
(6)
When both children transfer money to their parents, each child’s transfer depends
upon characteristics of the other child, scilicet, the other child’s income and feel-
ings of altruism for the parent. Both variables have a negative effect on transfer
amounts. Although it is not surprising that the less wealthy child will give parents
less, ceteris paribus, equation (6) also implies that if the altruism rises in the ﬁrst
(second) child, the second (ﬁrst) will give less to the parent, because he/she knows
that the other will give more.Before discussing overall parental consumption in this case, it is worthwhile
exploring the condition that must hold for a child to make a transfer. The numer-
ator in either expression in equation (6) must be greater than zero, or the optimal











Equation (7) lends insight as to what conditions must take place for both chil-
dren to transfer. Child 1 will be more likely to give a transfer if her income is
higher relative to the parents’ income. However, the transfer is decreasing with
child 2’s relative income. The combination implies that if income is particularly
unequally distributed among children, then the poorer child is less likely to make
transfers. A condition, then, for calculations regarding the inefﬁciency of transfers
from two children is that the incomes of the children must be relatively equally
distributed.





γ1 + γ2 + γ1γ2
(w1 + w2 + wp) (8)
Parental consumption, then, depends upon the aggregate income of the two chil-
dren and the parents, weighted by a function of the altruism parameters of the chil-
dren. At this point, we are interested in the distance from the efﬁcient outcome,
that would occur if all three pooled income and allocated each consumption based





1 + γ1 + γ2
3 + γ1 + γ2 + γp1 + γp2
(w1 + w2 + wp) (9)
The numerator in equation (9 represents the aggregate weight that the pooled
household would put on parental consumption; the parent’s weight is 1, the ﬁrst
child γ1, and the second child γ2. The denominator includes all of the weights, in-
cluding the two parental weights that parents put on their children’s consumption.
Since the Pareto optimal consumption for parents with one child was larger
than the actual consumption, it is not surprising that the parent again consumes
less than is Pareto optimal when both children are giving transfers. I again deﬁne





w1 + w2 + wp
=
1 + γ1 + γ2
3 + γ1 + γ2 + γp1 + γp2
−
γ1γ2
γ1 + γ2 + γ1γ2
(10)Equation (10) can be rewritten as:
η2 =
γ1(1 + γ1) + γ2(1 + γ2) − γ1γ2(γp1 + γp2)
(3 + γ1 + γ2 + γp1 + γp2)(γ1 + γ2 + γ1γ2)
(11)
I then compare η2, which is the fraction of overall consumption less than the
efﬁcient amount that the parents consumes when they receive transfers from two
children, to η1, which is the fraction of overall consumption less than the efﬁcient
amount consumed when receiving transfers from one child. I ﬁnd that for a large
range of values of γi, i = 1,2,p1,p2, that η2 > η1.1 Generally, so long as γ1
and γ2 are greater than 1
3, parents become public goods. Because of the strategic
behavior of their children, they consume a smaller fraction of the pooled income
than they would if they only had one child.2
The theoretical model therefore suggests conditions under which parents be-
come public goods for their adult children. First, it must be that children are both
somewhat altruistic or care somewhat about their parents’ consumption. With
Asian cultures and the concept of ﬁlial piety in mind, the presence of altruism pa-
rameters greater than 1
3 seems quite reasonable. Second, transfers will not occur
from several children unless the children have higher incomes than the parents,
and furthermore the inequality between the incomes of the children cannot be too
high. After an introduction to the data set I will use in this paper, I will attempt to
test some of these hypotheses.
3 Data
To describe the living arrangements of the elderly in rural China, I will use the
China National Rural Survey (CNRS).3 The CNRS was a household survey com-
pleted in six provinces of rural China (Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei,
and Sichuan). To attempt to accurately reﬂect varying income distributions within
each province, one county was randomly selected from within each income quin-
tile for the province, as measured by the gross value of industrial output. Two
villages were then randomly selected within each county, and twenty randomly
1I am still working on the proof right now.
2A generalization to N children is also planned.
3The data were collected by a team led by Loren Brandt of the University of Toronto, Scott
Rozelle of the University of California at Davis, and Linxiu Zhang of the Center for Chinese
Agricultural Policy.selected households per village, both those with their residency permits (or huk-
ous) in the village and those without, were surveyed. A total of 1199 households
were surveyed.
The survey gathered detailed information on household demographic char-
acteristics, wealth, agricultural production, non-farm activities and investment.
Several parts of the household survey were targeted to learn speciﬁc information
about older residents of the household. Although the term “elderly” is a loaded
one, I will deﬁne the “elderly” to mean all residents of households that are older
than 50 years old, for one practical and one demographic reason. From a practi-
cal standpoint, the survey included two speciﬁc modules designed to learn about
the elderly. Besides the standard data on individuals, such as age, education and
marriage status, for all individuals over the age of 50 the survey included a special
section on health status. In one question, we ask each near elderly and elderly to
report if they were: “not ill,” “slightly ill,” or “seriously ill.” After determining
whether or not each person was ill, we then asked each member of the household
that was over 50 years old a set of questions designed to create an ADL (Activities
of Daily Living) index in order to assess the severity of the illness. Enumerators
asked each person if it was difﬁcult or not to walk, stand, bend at the waist or lift a
5-kilogram weight. Respondents also told enumerators if they could bathe, dress,
eat or go to the toilet by themselves. Since several authors ﬁnd that the health
status of the elderly is an important determinant of their living arrangements, I
can use these data to test the effects of health status on their living arrangement.
The second module asked for basic information, including the gender, age, edu-
cation level, and place of residence, of all children of of elderly members of the
household that did not reside there.
Althoughconsideringhouseholdmembersover50aselderlymightseemques-
tionable, it makes a great deal of sense from the perspective of the life cycle. In
China, people tend to get married and have children when they are between 20
and 30 years of age. Children in rural China start school between the ages of 5
and 7, and modally go to school for the required 9 years. Therefore, at age 16 or
so they begin to either look for employment or begin to help on the farm full time.
As a result, by the time the parents have turned 50, their children have reached
the age at which they look to get married and have children. Therefore, they face
the choice modeled in this paper, whether to live alone or to live with one of their
children.
Several indicators of household well-being can be calculated using the CNRS.
Using the sections of the survey on employment, farming, non-farming busi-
nesses, and other income, a measure of household income was calculated. An-other section of the survey was focused on collecting data on household expendi-
tures, although it was collected in only one half of the sample. Finally, the sections
of the survey focused on learning about investment allow for the calculation of the
value of household assets. Therefore, relative household welfare can be measured
in three different ways.
Not all households in the sample include a member over 50 years old, whereas
others have elderly couples or even elderly couple and their parents living in them.
I ﬁnd 509 households that have an elderly resident. To do my analysis at the
household level, I followed Cameron’s (2000) reasoning regarding the attributes
of the elderly to include in my regressions. I categorize the elderly by the oldest
member of the household, whether male or female. If the oldest person’s spouse
also lives in the household, I include the male’s education, because the male’s
education level is likely to have the largest effect on the household income. The
health variable reﬂects the oldest member of the household as well.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
The model in section 2 implies that although the aggregate amount of transfers
received by parents increases as the number of children they have increases, the
average transfer given per child decreases, and the inefﬁciency of the transfer de-
creases. However, the theoretical results do not lead directly to predictions about
cohabitation. For the remainder of the paper, I will assume that allowing one’s
parents to cohabit represents a large transfer. Although parents may provide ei-
ther housework or hours on the farm in exchange for cohabitation, in general they
live in households that have much higher living standards (Table ??). Further-
more, in the sample parents who cohabit with children actually do less housework
and childcare than those who live alone; parents who live with their children work
X hours on the farm, relative to Y hours among parents who do not cohabit.
If cohabitation is like a large transfer, then one would expect the number of
children to decrease the probability that a parent (or married couple) cohabits with
theirchildren, becauseanyonechildwouldbelesslikelytowanttoprovidealarge
transfer.4 As explained above, this hypothesis is conditional on the income distri-
bution of children. To illustrate, assume that all of the γ parameters are equal. If
the income distribution is relatively equal, then if transfers are positive, according
to the model no child would take in the parent. If one child was relatively rich,
4Note that in this paper, I will not test any empirical hypotheses about transfers themselves. I
will reserve those tests for a later version of the paper.they would be more likely to take in the parent or parents. Unfortunately, the data
set does not include information about the incomes of the parents’ children. As
a result, I use age and education as proxies for the incomes of the children of the
elderly. Therefore, any signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the coefﬁcients for the effects
of characteristics of children of the elderly would imply that two sided bargaining
is taking place, at least over the possibility of cohabitation.5
I use a logit model to estimate the effects of human capital characteristics,
health, and the demographics of the elderly on whether or not they live with adult
children (Table 3). The main results are robust to speciﬁcation and the use of
different sub-samples of the data. When I include village level random effects to
improve the efﬁciency of the estimator, I test the hypothesis that the correlation
between the village error term and the household error term is zero, and reject it,
implying the random effects model is more appropriate.
I ﬁnd results that are generally consistent with other papers that have studied
cohabitation in China and in other countries in Asia (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2000;
Lee et al., 1994). When the oldest member of the household is a male, he is much
more likely to live by himself or with his wife than with one or more of his chil-
dren. The elderly with living spouses are also more likely to live by themselves, as
found by sociologists and anthropologists studying China (e.g. Davis-Friedmann,
1983). The older the oldest resident, the more likely he or she is to cohabit, and
consistent with the ﬁndings of Benjamin, Brandt, and Fan (2003), I ﬁnd that ill-
ness has a weak, but positive, relationship with cohabitation.
Consistent with the theory presented in section 2, I ﬁnd that as the elderly
have more children, they are less likely to live with them, ceteris paribus (Table3,
rows 6-7). I ﬁnd roughly the same coefﬁcient among male and female children,
and the coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant. Although one might expect for
reasons of “ﬁlial piety” the male children to take care of their elderly parents, I
ﬁnd the opposite is the case. If children indeed place a large value on the transfer
that cohabitation represents, they become less likely to make that large transfer
if other children exist, because they also expect those children to give to their
parents, a behavior that seemingly does not take place nearly as often when one
child takes care of the elderly (Table 2). Although this result is different than
that found in other countries, such as Malaysia by Lee et al. (1994), recall that
Malaysia gives a tax credit for caring for an elderly parent (or both), which would
5Cameron (2000) models the residence decision of the elderly as nested logit decision, to
account for the possibility that parents ﬁrst choose the child that gives them the highest utility,
then decide whether to live with that child or not. Due to data limitations, I use a reduced form
approach.decrease the size of the net transfer represented by cohabitation.
Second, I add a number of characteristics of the adult children to the regres-
sion (Table 3, columns 3-4). I include the age and education level of the eldest
son, as well as the average age and education levels of the children of the eldest
member of the household. The human capital attributes of the eldest son that are
measurable have no discernible effect on the likelihood that cohabitation takes
place.6 Although the average age of the children of the elderly has no statistical
effect on the probability of cohabitation, I ﬁnd that as the average schooling level
of the children increases, the probability of cohabitation decreases. This coefﬁ-
cient is likely due to cohort effects rather than anything in the model. Educational
attainment is much higher among younger cohorts than among older cohorts, and
it is likely that older, less educated children are more likely to live with their par-
ents. The inequality hypothesis would be best tested by including the standard
deviation of education in the model. When it is included, it has a negative coef-
ﬁcient (−0.11; full results not reported) but it is not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. It could be that more data would conﬁrm this hypothesis.
In summary, I ﬁnd several attributes to the CNRS data that are consistent with
the theoretical model. I ﬁnd that transfers are slightly larger and far more frequent
to elderly who live by themselves rather than to elderly who live with one of
their adult children. I also ﬁnd that as the number of children that the elderly
have increases, the probability they live with those children decreases, holding
attributes of the elderly and the children constant. This result is consistent with
the idea that children treat the elderly like public goods under certain conditions,
in this case when incomes are higher and when altruism parameters are reasonably
high.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored the idea that parents can be treated like public goods
by their children. There are several conditions that are necessary for this to take
place. Perhaps most importantly, it must be that the children’s incomes are sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the parents’ incomes. Second, it must be that the children’s
incomes are relatively similar, or else they will depend upon the richest of the chil-
6Of course, some of the elderly have no sons. In the few households that ﬁt this category,
the age and education level of the eldest daughter were used instead. I ﬁnd that the results are
qualitatively the same, whether I remove the households from the regression or use the female
children’s traits, or remove the variables from the regression entirely.dren to provide transfers, because each child takes into account the best response
of the other children when deciding how much to give. Finally, at least in the two
child case I ﬁnd that the children must feel some altruism towards their parents
(e.g. γ ≥ 1
3) for the relative inefﬁciency to be worse than in the one child case.
I examine a data set collected in rural China in late 2000 and ﬁnd they are
broadly consistent with these hypotheses. I ﬁnd that the elderly who live alone
have much lower living standards than are found in households the elderly live in
with adult children. The multivariate ﬁndings are broadly consistent with other
work on intergenerational living arrangements found in the literature. I ﬁnd that
holding other factors constant, having additional children decreases the chance
that the elderly live with their children. If the children consider having their par-
ents living with them as a large transfer, then these results are totally consistent
with the model. Further research is necessary to understand what type of value
can be placed on cohabitation in terms of the transfer.
These results have a quite interesting interpretation for China. China’s noto-
rious one-child policy and other family planning policies dramatically decreased
birth rates in a great deal of the country beginning in the early 1970s. If the theory
presented in this paper is correct, then the one child policy has actually helped the
elderly in places where it was enforced vigorously, because one child will look
after their parents’ welfare better than several. In other areas, where the policy
has not been enforced as vigorously and birth rates are still high, the elderly may
need more governmental support. These areas are typically in the rural West, so if
the government begins to allocate more resources for the elderly in the near term,
this theory suggests they begin in the rural interior.References
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China, 1988-1999,” working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong.Table 1: Selected Indicators of Well-Being in Per-Capita Terms, Rural China,
2000
Gener- N Average Age, Average Average Average
ations Household Head Income Expenditures Value of Assets
1 127 59.4 1259 1454 7455
2 772 42.8 2805 2631 12473
3 284 45.4 2256 2162 10483
4 16 52.4 1670 1564 6453
Source: CNRS.Table 2: Transfers Received by Elderly Households, Rural China, 2000
Living Share Receiving Average Average Share,
Arrangement Transfers Transfer Household Income
Living Alone 69 1464.5 53.2
In Extended Family 25 1129.6 14.0
Notes: Sample size is 399. Columns 2 and 3 are conditional on a transfer being made.
Source: CNRS.Table 3: Determinants of Cohabitation among the Elderly, Rural China, 2000
Explanatory
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Characteristics of the Elderly
Gender (1=male) −2.82** −2.75** −2.85** −2.89**
(0.63) (0.66) (0.64) (0.66)
Age 0.04** 0.05** 0.07** 0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Years of −0.08** −0.10 −0.06 −0.08
Education (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Married? −0.85* −0.90** −0.86** −0.90**
(1=yes) (0.40) (0.43) (0.41) (0.44)
ADL Index 0.44* 0.45* 0.45* 0.44
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
Family Characteristics
Number of −0.37** −0.47** −0.35** −0.44
male Children (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Number of −0.35** −0.38** −0.42** −0.43
female Children (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Eldest Son, Age −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Eldest Son, Years 0.01 −0.0004
of Education (0.05) (0.06)
Mean Age, −0.05 −0.05
Children (0.03) (0.03)
Mean Education, −0.14** −0.13**
Children (0.06) (0.06)
Random Effects none village none village
LR Test Statistic, ρ = 0 8.51** 7.00**
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level;
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level. Sample size is 509. The likelihood ratio
test statistic for the signﬁcance of the random effects is distributed χ2 with 1 degree of
freedom.
Source: CNRS.